主讲人：王博助理教授
时间：2020-04-30 2020年04月30日（周四）14:00-15:00
地点：综合楼526 国际商学院
摘要：
We introduce a name market into an overlapping generations model to address politician selection and political accountability when there is no re-election concern. We show the name market could mitigate both problems. On the one hand, name screens young politician; on the other, name incentivizes old politician. Therefore, politician selection and political accountability arise even in the absence of re-election. More importantly, we provide a crucial insight on political economy: it is because of the selection problem, that political accountability problem can be solved. With such an insight, we show that because the transparency on politician's type reduces the politician selection problem, it inevitably aggravates the political accountability problem. So the transparency crowds out the name. We finally derive the optimal information policies, and discuss their economic implications.
主讲人简介：
Bo Wang holds Ph.D. in Economics. He graduated from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in 2019. He is currently Assistant Professor at Zhejiang Gongshang University, International Business School. Bo’s research interests cover a broad range of topics in economics and finance, including financial economics, imperfect capital market, and name market. In financial economics, he has particular interests in studying how different fragilities of financial institutions affect systematic panic and investment decisions. His current research projects focus on name market and political incentive.